The Bombardment

The lack of ammunition and too few guns had been identified as a reason for the failure of the British offensives in 1915. With the 1916 plan came massed artillery and a stockpile of shells sufficient, it was thought, to destroy the enemy positions in an unprecedented five-day bombardment. The 7th Division's history noted;

'During these days the British gunners sent into the enemy's positions more shells than had been fired in the first twelve months of the war.'

The bombardment started on 24 June, five days before the planned date of the attack, which was to have been 29 June. The fire plan for each day U, V, W, X and Y-Days was detailed. On U-Day the bombardment opened with trench mortars starting to cut the enemy's belts of protective barbed wire, while medium batteries engaged enemy artillery in order to suppress the German's response. Overnight the process of harassing the enemy rear area began with the object of 'preventing replenishment of ammunition, food and water'. The enemy's response, according to the Official Historian:

'was generally feeble… when he did reply, fire was intensified, he was given four shells for every one of his, and if that did not stop him, larger guns and howitzers turned on.'

On V-Day, the main, continuous bombardment started with fire missions on the enemy trenches and the 18-pound field guns joined the process of cutting the wire, with Shrapnel shells. Meanwhile, the heavier guns concentrated on the German's underground forts, built beneath the villages that bisected the front line.

The plans for W, X and Y-Days were to follow a similar pattern as the previous days, with batteries coming out of action for planned periods for cooling of the guns, maintenance and rest. Observation posts, balloons and Royal Flying Corps (RFC) aeroplanes were to ensure the accuracy of the bombardment.

From U-Day onwards the plan required the gunners to fire a concentrated bombardment for 1 hour 20 minutes every day. The time of this particularly heavy bombardment varied. However, on Z-Day, it would only last 1 hour 5 minutes before Zero-Hour in an attempt to achieve some tactical surprise.

At night, machine guns thickened up the barrage, allowing some of the artillerymen to rest. Their task was to fire across no-man's-land to stop the Germans mending the wire cut during the day. The nightly machine gun bombardment was also aimed at 'the physical and moral exhaustion of the enemy'.

Amongst the infantry there were great expectations. 8th Division's historian wrote:

'Hope ran high that the result would be so to pulverise the enemy's defences that a legitimate chance would be given to the infantry to press forward to success. So far as the infantry themselves were concerned, all had been done that experience could suggest or ingenuity and foresight could devise.'

However, the effect of the bombardment was mixed. For instance, the task of cutting the enemy wire allocated to the New Army divisions' 18-pound field guns was in many cases beyond the inexperienced gunners. Setting the fuse correctly was vital; too short and the shell would burst over the wire with a much reduced effect; too long and the round would explode with little damage in the ground beneath the wire; lifting the dense coils of wire only for it to drop back in place, having suffered no visible damage. To cut the enemy wire, the artillery observation officers needed to observe the fall of shot but where possible, the Germans laid their wire out of sight of the British trenches. Patrols sent out by the 2nd Devons during the night to check progress of the bombardment found that the wire was badly cut and judging by the sounds of singing from the dugouts below, that the Germans were in good heart. Doubts were raised in many soldier's minds.

Across the front patrols brought in word of mixed results. A Battalion intelligence report recorded:

'Patrols report that there are sections of enemy wire on the Battalion front that seen to be largely untouched by the barrage but there are viable gaps. These are not straight forward and only a few yards wide. If they are not improved, their inadequacy will lead to bunching of the men in the attack.'

Despite the evidence, the senior commanders' confidence in the bombardment and the plan was undiminished.

The fire of medium and heavy guns on enemy trenches and strong points, seemed to be working, as wrecked trenches could easily been seen. However, this was largely surface damage and the German's dugouts in the chalk hillsides proved to be impervious to all but a direct hit from the heavier shells but the British had too few heavy guns. With signs of the coming battle being obvious in early 1916, orders were issued that German dugouts were to have at least seven metres of chalk above it. In addition, there were to be three exits to ensure that the troops were not trapped. Proof that the Germans were surviving the bombardment was given by a 2nd Middlesex patrol on 25/26 June, which went out onto the Ovillers Spur, where they and 2nd Devon were to attack. They reported:

'the deep dugouts in the enemy's lines were found full of Germans singing and apparently in good spirits notwithstanding our bombardment.'

However, that was after only two days of British artillery fire. For the Germans, safe below ground, the bombardment was at first an annoyance. Gradually, however, the relentless hammering of shells became wearing on the minds of the soldiers below ground. Inevitably, there were psychological casualties. Some Germans, reportedly 'went mad under the strain', which worsened as food ran out and as shellfire started to damage water and electricity supplies. Matters were made worse as troops due to come out of the line, had to remain in position. Another factor affecting the results of the bombardment was the failure of a significant number of shell fuses. The Official History states that the Fourth Army fired 1,508,652 rounds during the bombardment. However, up to 30% failed to explode and the failure rate amongst the heavier calibre shells had a particular impact on the effectiveness of the British artillery on the German's defensive position. This resulted from the faulty manufacture of fuses; the products of a hastily expanded armaments industry and the rushing of intricate fuses into full production.

The weather over the period 26-28 June was bad; therefore, the fire plan had to dwell for 48 hours and with a strict allocation of ammunition, the rate of artillery fire slackened. Consequently, 'the enemy were given an unexpected and, to him, invaluable opportunity to get food and water, and reinforcements to his front line garrisons'.

Despite the general confidence and the scale and intensity of the bombardment, some individuals expressed concerns. However, Fourth Army Tactical Notes issued a warning that deterred commanders and their men from voicing their concerns. It read:

'Finally, it must be remembered that all criticism by subordinates of their superiors, and of orders received from superior authority, will in the end recoil on the heads of the critics and undermine their authority with those below them.'

Despite this warning, concerns were expressed, if only, as in the case of 2nd Devon, in the form of patrol reports. Sadly, such reports were largely ignored.

Related Image Gallery

Fricourt Dugout	Ammunition dump	A heavy howitzer
Heavy Gun	Heavy Artillery Firing	Field Artillery
Exploding shell

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